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COMPARING U.S. AND E.U. 
STRATEGIES AGAINST WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION: 
SOME LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
MILAGROS AL v AREZ-VERDUGO· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Weapon(s) of mass destruction (WMD) is not a legal concept. Nonethe-
less the social sciences regularly use this term to encompass nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons to distinguish them from conventional 
weapons and indicate their inability to discriminate between civil and 
military targets. From a legal point of view, the international regulation 
of WMD belongs to the general law of disarmament and arms control. 
Their use under the strict conditions of the rule prohibiting states from 
using force in their international relations is governed by rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law, most of them customary in nature. International 
treaties govern the production, ownership and maintenance of a stock of 
WMD and contain three different sets of rules; one for each WMD tech-
nology. In fact, the dominant international legal activity concerning 
WMD has been the negotiation and implementation of arms control trea-
ties. Consequently, while some customary international norms restrict or 
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law at the Universitat de Barcelona and Visit-
ing scholar at Harvard University. The article results from a research project financed by the Span-
ish Ministry of Education - Postdoctoral Fellowship Program. The greater part of the work was 
done while I was Visiting Scholar at Cornell University (academic year 2004/5). An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the Fifteenth Annual Fulbright Symposium on International Legal 
Problems-Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law on April 8, 
2005, at Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco. Thanks are due to all those who 
commented on the drafts. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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prohibit the use of certain types of WMD, international law does not 
make the development and possession of WMD illegal outside the treaty 
context. 1 
In the post-Cold War era, WMD have become a renewed problem for 
international peace and security. 2 Some old problems concerning mem-
bership, compliance and enforcement of the relevant treaties already in 
existence persist. Nonetheless, technological development, technical 
difficulties in controlling dual-use products and materials, disintegration 
of states, and international terrorism are at the root of some 'new security 
concerns:' control over the production and distribution channels of these 
weapons; and control over goods and products susceptible to dual mili-
tary and civilian use. In addition, the political emphasis has shifted to 
the possibility of international terrorist groups using WMD and, within 
this framework, connections between such groups and some proliferant 
states. In this sense, the notion of 'proliferation' is shifting, as it comes 
to include the spread of WMD both among states and from states to non-
state actors or terrorist groups. 
International regulation and control of WMD is not a United States -
European Union bilateral issue, but it appears on the political agenda of 
the transatlantic relation and agreements or disagreements between the 
two have international consequences. Agreements signal joint action by 
an important part of the international community and, often, can inspire 
or encourage universal commitments as well as other international ac-
tions. Disagreements, however, block such joint action and, sometimes, 
impede international measures of universal (or at least collective) scope. 
Within this context, the purpose of this article is to analyze how these 
two major international actors, the United States (U.S.) and the European 
Union (E.U.), define their strategies and policies to deal with problems-
old and new-related to WMD. In fact, the U.S. approach to managing 
proliferation of WMD has undergone a remarkable evolution, if not a 
change, in the post-Cold War era. 3 At the same time, it has been a period 
1. As understood from the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal-
ity of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. See Advisory Opinion 1996I.C.J. 226. 
2. See, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004); see also, Report of the UN Secretary 
General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. 
Al59/2005 (2005). 
3. This evolution began with the Counter-Proliferation Initiative, announced on December 7, 
1993, by the U.S. Secretary of State Les Aspin, during his speech to the National Academy of Sci-
ences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control. The Initiative introduced for the first 
time a new military component in the U.S. policy against WMD. Other documents from the Clinton 
Administration including the military and the possible use of force as a component of the U.S. 
counter proliferation policy are as follows: Proliferation: Threat and Response - 2001, Department 
of Defense (Jan. 10, 2001); Proliferation: Threat and Response - 1997, Department of Defense 
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of remarkable changes for the European integration process, leading to 
the transformation of the European Communities (a specifically eco-
nomic organization) into the E.u. (an obviously political entity). Al-
though its policies and actions have long included much that is related to 
nonproliferation matters, the E.U. had not designed a general approach 
against WMD until two years ago. 
Three criteria will guide the comparison between the U.S. and the E.U. 
policies against WMD: scope, objectives and instruments. The two ref-
erence documents are "The National Strategy to combat WMD" adopted 
on December 2002, and "The European Strategy against the proliferation 
ofWMD," approved by the European Council on December 2003.4 The 
comparison should permit identification of the grounds for possible 
changes in the international regime of these kinds of weapons. 
II. THE U.S. AND THE E.U. POLICIES AGAINST WMD: 
DIFFERENT SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Disarmament and arms control are the two main axes of the international 
debate on WMD. The first puts the very existence of these weapons un-
der discussion, seeking to destroy them, while the arms control perspec-
tive tries to establish an international legal framework for the use, pro-
duction and development of these weapons. International actors' policy 
scope and objectives can be located on these two general axes; and the 
current international legal regime of WMD belongs, primarily, to the 
arms control perspective, although it includes important disarmament 
elements. 
A. U.S. POLICY SCOPE AND OBJECTIVESs 
A narrow definition of the threat arising from WMD determines the 
scope of U.S. policy. Indeed, if compared with documents of relevant 
(Nov. 25, 1997); Proliferation: Threat and Response, Department of Defense (Apr. 1996) (visited 
Sept. 1,2005) <http://www.fas.org/irp/threatlwmd.htm>. 
4. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002112IWMDStrategy.pdf> and 
<http://ue.E.U . .intluedocslcmsUpload/stJ570S.en03.pdf.> The E.U. was reluctant to adopt a WMD 
Strategy based on a Common Position, a Joint Action or a Common Strategy, the legal instruments 
available under the E.U. Common Foreign and Security Policy. Consequently, the Strategy is a 
political declaration with an informal character. Concern that this would undermine implementation 
was offset by the commitment to review policy impact regularly and, every six months, the External 
Relations Council discusses a progress report on the implementation of the E.U. Strategy. The first 
of these debates took place on June 14, 2004, when the Council discussed and adopted the First 
Progress Report on the implementation of the E.U. Strategy. See Press statement, Council for Gen-
eral Issues and Foreign Relations, Sess. No. 2591, at 15 (Luxemburg June 14,2004). 
5. A diagnosis of the problem and goals for resolving it are set up in the initial paragraphs of 
the U.S. Strategy. See National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, at Introduction 
(Dec. 2002). 
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international organizations and with previous U.S. documents, the current 
U.S. diagnosis of the WMD threat is limited and restricted: only WMD 
in the possession of hostile states and terrorists are considered a threat. 6 
The U.S. Strategy does not define the criteria U.S. authorities will use to 
determine the hostility of states, leaving that as a political decision. 
Similarly, with no international definition of terrorism, the U.S. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act set up a list of criteria according to which 
U.S. authorities regularly update a list of foreign terrorist groups; its con-
tent has been, sometimes, controversial. 7 
The restricted scope of U.S. policy against WMD has its parallel in U.S. 
goals. While titled "The National Strategy to combat WMD" and pre-
sented as a strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further 
proliferation, the document is very specific that the goal is the protection 
of the U.S., American forces and U.S. friends and allies from the "exist-
ing and growing WMD threat." In this sense, the U.S. goal can be quali-
fied as clearly subjective: WMD are not, in themselves, the problem, nor 
is proliferation. The U.S. objective is to protect itself and its allies or 
friends from a possible use of WMD by previously targeted actors. 8 
This goal is given concrete expression in three target areas: counter-
proliferation to combat WMD use, nonproliferation to combat WMD 
proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. 
The last relates to internal measures to react to and face the consequences 
6. As Cirincione says, the Bush Administration has changed the issue from "what" to "who." 
See Joseph Cirincione, Speech: Proliferation Threats and Solutions, 19 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF 
LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 344 (2005). This diagnosis means a clear change from previous 
U.S. National Security documents. For example, the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy stated as 
follows: "WMD is a global concern that transcends national borders. It is the greatest potential 
threat to global stability and security. Proliferation threatens to provide rogue states, terrorist and 
international crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible damage on the U.S., our allies, 
and U.S. citizens and troops abroad." See The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century 2 (Dec. 1999). 
7. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations designated by the Secre-
tary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as 
amended. See <http://www.state.govlslctlrls/fs/3719I.htm> (visited Aug. 10,2005). 
8. In this area, there are significant changes too. The U.S. National Security Strategy adopted 
in 1998 fixed the following goals: to deter and be prepared to counter the use or threatened the use of 
WMD; to reduce the threat posed by existing arsenals of WMD; to halt the smuggling of nuclear 
materials, identity the technical information, technologies and materials that cannot be allowed to 
fall into the hands of those seeking to develop and produce WMD, and to stop the proliferation of 
non safeguarded dual use technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the hands of parties 
hostile to U.S. and global security interests. See The White House, A National Security Strategy for 
a New Century 6 (Dec. 1998). 
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of a WMD attack. Internal measures are not relevant from the interna-
tionallegal point of view or, therefore, to the purposes of this article. 9 
The counter-proliferation policy is intended to prepare the U.S. military 
and appropriate civilian agencies to deter and defend against the full 
range of possible WMD employment scenarios. It seeks to assure that 
U.S. forces can sustain operations to defeat WMD-armed adversaries. 
Counter-proliferation has, therefore, a specific meaning: deterrence, de-
fense and, if need be, victory over hostile states and terrorists. At this 
point, it is relevant to point out the equal treatment that the Strategy envi-
sions for state and non-state actors presenting a WMD threat. 
The nonproliferation policy is targeted to prevent states and terrorists 
from acquiring WMD and missiles. To this end, the Strategy proposes 
enhancing "traditional measures" (diplomacy, arms control, multilateral 
agreements, threat reduction assistance and export controls) that seek to 
dissuade or impede those seeking access to sensitive technologies, mate-
rial and expertise. Additionally, the policy purports to ensure compli-
ance with relevant international agreements; to improve the capability to 
prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD and missile technology, exper-
tise, and material; and to identify and pursue new methods of prevention, 
such as national criminalization of proliferation activities and expanded 
safety and security measures. 
B. E.U. POLICY SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
The scope and objectives of the E.U. policy with regard WMD seem to 
be in line with the major statements of international organizations. The 
scope of the E.U. policy is "proliferation of WMD," defined as a threat 
against international peace and security and against the E.U. and its in-
9. Nonetheless, Fidler considers that this is part of the 'new' strategy on WMD. He argues 
that WMD policy is moving from one dominated by arms control to a three-part strategy. The first 
part involves international law that addresses WMD threats presented by states (arms control treaties 
and the 'new' right of self-defense to address WMD threats from state actors). The second part 
comprises international law that attempts to address WMD threats posed by non-state actors, namely 
terrorists (multilateral antiterrorism treaties, efforts to use international law to improve the safety and 
security of WMD agents and equipment and military responses to terrorist threats). The third part of 
the trifurcated strategy focuses on domestic defense against and preparedness for WMD events: a 
"homeland security" framework that is taking shape through international cooperative efforts on 
improving domestic readiness for WMD attacks against vulnerable societies. See David P. Fidler, 
International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach? 14 DUKE 
J. COMPo & INT'L L. 39-88 (2004). 
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terests. The risk that terrorists will acquire this kind of weapon "adds a 
new critical dimension to this threat" according the E.U. position. 10 
The different status of E.U. Member States as regards nuclear weapons 
(particularly, the status of France and the United Kingdom as legal nu-
clear powers under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons--NPT ll ) shapes the European position, preventing the E.U. 
from rejecting all WMD outright. 12 On the other hand, the E. U Strategy 
clearly advocates for a universal ban on chemical and biological weap-
ons, because all member states have ratified the Conventions on Biologi-
cal and Chemical Weapons. 13 
Concerning terrorism, the E.U. diagnosis reflects the current historical 
period in linking WMD with international terrorism, recognizing that 
international terrorism adds a new dimension to the problem of WMD, 
and expressing concern consistent with the perspective of other European 
organizations. 14 This link, however, does not change or shift the respon-
sibility for WMD proliferation away from states. In fact, the E.U. seems 
to be confident that exerting control over states can significantly reduce 
the terrorism risk, since internal state action can reduce the access of 
terrorists groups to the expertise, resources, technical infrastructure, and 
logistics needed to develop and use WMD. 15 
With this delimitation of scope, the E.U. objectives are "to prevent, deter, 
halt, and where possible, eliminate proliferation programs of concern 
10. See E.U. Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ~ I(Dec. 2003) 
[hereinafter E.U.-WMD Strategy]. 
II. See Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 729 U.N.T.S. 1-10485. 
12. In similar sense, see Gerrard Quille and Stephen Pullinger, The European Union: Tackling 
the Threatfrom Weapons of Mass Destruction, in ISIS REpORT (Nov. 2003) (visited July 1,2005) 
<http://www.isis-europe.org!>; see also Clara Portela, The Role of the E.U. in the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, PRIF REpORTS No. 65, 3-5 (2003). 
13. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction (BTWC), lOIS U.N.T.S. 
1-14860; see also Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (CWC), 1975 U.N.T.S. 1-33757. 
14. According to E.U. analysis, the connection between WMD and terrorist groups is particu-
larly strong in terms of chemical and biological weapons because their specific characteristics make 
them especially attractive to terrorists. See E.U.-WMD Strategy, supra note 10, ~ 8. 
IS. The document states that non-proliferation, disarmament and weapons control can make a 
fundamental contribution to the global fight against terrorism. !d., ~ 3. The Assembly of the West-
ern European Union (WEU) advocates for an approach to the state proliferation ofWMD that differs 
from the strategy to deal with the WMD/international terrorism connection. See Report submitted 
on behalf of the Defense Committee by Mr. Schloten, Chemical and biological weapons control -
new challenges, WEU Doc. AlI758 (Dec. 5, 2001); see also Report submitted on behalf of the 
Defense Committee by Mr. Le Guen, Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism, WEU Doc. 
AlI858 (June 3,2004). 
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worldwide." 16 This is in fact a limited, but realistic, objective. Elimina-
tion of proliferation is subject to conditions of possibility (though their 
nature is not explained), and the objectives do not include each and every 
WMD program (which would be beyond E.U. capacities). Determining 
which programs are of concern worldwide is necessarily subjective. 
Concern worldwide does not mean Security Council determination. 17 
The E.U. position is a universal one, but the Union remains reluctant, on 
this particular point, to limit possible action to only those programs de-
termined by the Security Council to be a threat. 
III. CONSEQUENT INSTRUMENTS 
In order to compare U.S./E.u. instruments in the fight against WMD, I 
will use a double classification. The first classification distinguishes 
between unilateral and multilateral instruments. The second distin-
guishes between legal, diplomatic and operational instruments. Multilat-
eral instruments include universal and regional, or restricted, cooperation 
among states and can have a formal legal basis (international agreement) 
or an ad hoc political basis. Finally, both unilateral and multilateral in-
struments can be legal, diplomatic or operational in nature. 
A. U.S. INSTRUMENTS 
U.S. policy against WMD differentiates between counter-proliferation 
and nonproliferation instruments. The U.S. counter-proliferation set of 
instruments builds upon three components: interdiction, deterrence, and 
defense and mitigation. Interdiction efforts seek to prevent the move-
ment of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and 
terrorist organizations. To this end, the strategy proposes to enhance 
U.S. military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement capabilities. 
In other words, the U.S. approach relies on unilateral enforcement meas-
ures of both operational (military, intelligence and technical capabilities) 
and legal nature (law enforcement capabilities). 
Deterrence instruments are used "to persuade potential adversaries not to 
seek or use WMD." The special characteristics of contemporary adver-
saries (hostile states and terrorist groups) require, following the U.S. 
Strategy, new methods of deterrence. Beside a strong declaratory policy 
and effective military forces, the U.S. Strategy adds the right to respond 
with overwhelming force - including resort to all U.S. options - to the 
16. See E.U.-WMD Strategy, supra note 10, ~ 2. 
17. Under the current state of international law on disannament and anns control, the prolifera-
tion programs of states that are not parties to present international treaties can be questioned only if 
the Security Council detennines that they are a threat to international peace and security. 
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use of WMD against the U.S., American forces abroad, or friends and 
allies. Deterrence instruments are, therefore, unilateral instruments of 
both diplomatic (strong declaratory policy) and operational nature (effec-
tive military forces with the right to respond with overwhelming force to 
the use ofWMD). 
Finally, defense and mitigation involves the capabilities, including pre-
emptive measures, of U.S. military forces and civilian agencies to defend 
against WMD-armed adversaries. 18 This requires an ability to detect and 
destroy an adversary's WMD assets before they are used. In addition, it 
includes robust active defenses (such as air and missile defenses to dis-
rupt, disable or destroy WMD targets) and passive defenses, as well as 
mitigation measures (against the effects of WMD attacks). Hence, they 
are unilateral instruments of an operational nature. 
The U.S. Strategy clearly puts the emphasis on counter proliferation 
measures; it is the first pillar developed, and the words used emphasize 
this preference. U.S. counter-proliferation instruments are, basically, 
unilateral measures. Specifically relevant is the U.S. policy treatment of 
the use of force as a possible counter-proliferation instrument. With no 
reference to the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force, the for-
mulation of the use of force in the document carries no constraint similar 
to the condition of proportionality required by customary international 
law on self-defense. 19 In addition, the U.S. right to respond, as character-
IS. The debate around the 'preemptive use offorce' goes beyond the scope and purpose of this 
article. A few examples of the literature on the issue are as follows: Abraham D. Sofaer, On the 
Necessity of Pre-emption , 14(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 209-226 (2003); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the 
Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14(2) EUR. J. INT'L L. 227-240 (2003); VV AA, Agora: Future 
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97(3) AM. J. INT'L L. 553-642 (2003); Agora(Continued), 97(3) 
AM. J. INT'L L. S03-S72 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: a legal assessment, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 737-736 (2004). Schmitt considers current U.S. Strategies not, in 
themselves, unlawful but possibly so depending on the U.S. action and application. This is not the 
point of view of Thomas M. Franck, who affirms that U.S. National Security Strategy: 
set out the doctrine that the nation is free to use force against any foe it perceives as a 
potential threat to its security, at any time of its choosing and with any means at its 
disposal... [and] aims at ending all collective control over the U.S. recourse to force. 
This is not a system transformation but a system abrogation. 97(3) AM. 1. INT'L L. 619-
620 (2003). 
I agree with Professor Franck's opinion. 
19. Relevant members of the Bush Administration clearly express their faith in and support for 
this policy, stating the belief that some states' cooperation (i.e. Iran) "has been helpfully motivated 
by their fear of U.S. action against them." See John R. Bolton, The Bush Administration's Forward 
Strategy for Nonproliferation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 403 (2005). Christopher Clarke Posteraro proposes 
the legal doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention, as a legitimate 
answer to the modem threat of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. See Chris-
topher Clarke Posteraro Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-
Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. 1. INT'L L. 151-212 (2002). 
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ized in the Strategy, changes a traditional U.S. security assurance that it 
will not use nuclear forces against non-nuclear countries. 20 
Nonproliferation, the second leg of the U.S. strategy, includes a wide set 
of actions that, nevertheless, do not always comprise concrete measures. 
The U.S. document begins by referring to "Active Nonproliferation di-
plomacy" to dissuade supplier states and to induce proliferant states to 
end their programs. This activity includes building coalitions to support 
U.S. initiatives; the document seems to refer to ad hoc coalitions, estab-
lished on a case-by-case basis. 21 
Second, concerning existing multilateral nonproliferation and arms con-
trol regimes, the document's emphasis is on improving their effective-
ness and compliance by member states, but there are few mentions of 
concrete measures directed toward these ends. Particularly, the Strategy 
includes three measures regarding the NPT and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA): ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by 
all NPT states, assurances that all states put in place full-scope IAEA 
safeguards agreements, and appropriate increases in funding for the 
Agency. The Strategy also proposes strengthening the Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime (MTCR) and, specifically, proposes support for 
universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct against Ballis-
tic Missile Proliferation. 
Third, under the title of 'Threat Reduction Cooperation" the document 
includes the U.S. assistance program to Russia and other former Soviet 
states (security of WMD facilities, missiles, and related materials) and 
endorses international action through the G-8 Global Partnership against 
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. These en-
dorsements, however, do not come with any declaration in favor of in-
creasing funding. 
Fourth, controls on nuclear materials focus on discouraging the world-
wide accumulation of separated plutonium and minimizing the use of 
highly enriched uranium. To this end, the document makes reference to 
the National Energy Policy and the goal of developing recycling and fuel 
treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-
intensive, and more proliferation-resistant. No other reference exists to, 
20. See Principles and Objectives adopted by the NPT 1995 Review Conference and Security 
Assurances Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/6. See Alyn Ware, Nuclear Proliferation: Rule of Force or Rule 
of Law? Legal Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism, Proliferation, and War, 2 SEA TILE J. 
SOc. JUST. 251 (2003-2004). 
21. The document concludes this section with a statement that, if nonproliferation efforts fail, 
U.S. will have available operational capabilities to defend against WMD use. 
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for example, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)22 or any other 
measure related to the supply of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. 
The U.S. export controls system is the fifth line of action on nonprolif-
eration efforts. The Strategy proposes updating and strengthening that 
system while recognizing the needs of U.S. businesses. To this end, the 
U.S. will focus on truly sensitive exports to hostile or proliferant states, 
while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace. 23 
Finally, nonproliferation sanctions are treated as a component of the 
strategy against WMD proliferation. The U.S. document contains no 
discussion of the necessary legal basis of this instrument (the UN Secu-
rity Council, regional organizations, etc.) and seems to anticipate the 
modification of the existing U.S. sanctions legislation to better integrate 
sanctions into overall U.S. strategy.24 
Generally, there is no clear U.S. preference for a particular set of nonpro-
liferation instruments. Instead, the document contains general statements 
concerning universal regimes, with no reference to concrete measures 
directed at reinforcing their effectiveness and compliance. Nor is there 
any mention of 'co-responsibility' instruments, such as U.S. disarma-
ment commitments and other self-constraint measures in the area of nu-
clear materials. 
Finally, four enabling functions are aimed at integrating the pillars of 
U.S. policy. The first is improved intelligence collection and analysis of 
the full range of WMD threats. The second deals with research and de-
velopment to develop cutting-edge technologies that can quickly and 
effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, de-
feat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD. The third function, titled 
"Strengthened International Cooperation" refers exclusively to working 
22. The FMCT is under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. Following an initiative 
from President Clinton, the U.N. General Assembly adopted in Dec. 1993 Resolution 48/75L calling 
for the negotiation of a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable 
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices." For the full text of the U.N. resolutions and key documents of the Conference on disarma-
ment related to the FMCT, see the Federation of American Scientists website 
<http://www.fas.orglnuke/controllfmctl>. 
23. So, the recent legislation making exports of nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium) 
easier is not necessarily 'an accident' in the U.S. legislative process. Among other critiques to this 
legal change, see Scott Parrish, Despite Nuclear Terrorism Risks, Congress Relaxes REV Export 
Controls, August 4, 2005, CNS Research Story (visited Aug. 16, 2005) 
<http://www.cns.miis.edulpubs/weekl050804.htm>;andAlanJ.Kuperman.TheEnergyBiII·sGift 
to Terrorists, NEW YORK TIMES, August 11,2005. 
24. About the 'usefulness' and 'employment' of WMD-related U.S. unilateral sanctions, see 
Bolton, supra note 19, at 397-398. 
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closely with like-minded countries on all elements of the U.S. nonprolif-
eration strategy. Finally, the fourth function is to unite all elements of 
the overall strategy in targeted efforts against both supplier and recipient 
states and terrorist groups that seek to acquire these weapons. 
B. E.U. INSTRUMENTS 
Four main principles guide the European approach to proliferation: mul-
tilateralism, comprehensive action, co-responsibility, and gradualism. 25 
Multilateralism incorporates the defense, implementation, and rein-
forcement of international disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and 
agreements, as well as support for multilateral institutions that verify and 
control compliance. The comprehensive action principle implies the 
employment of all the Union's resources and tools to achieve E.U. goals 
and the integration of nonproliferation into all E.U. policies. Co-
responsibility acts in two different directions: first, through export con-
trol on dual use goods and technologies and, second, through the E.U.'s 
contribution to solving the main causes of instability (development assis-
tance, reduction of poverty, and promotion of human rights). Lastly, the 
principle of gradualism guides the application of anti-proliferation meas-
ures, which are both preventive and coercive. The former constitutes the 
first line of defense against proliferation for the E.U. and includes politi-
cal and diplomatic actions as well as reliance on competent international 
organizations. The latter embraces measures envisaged in Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter and under international law, which the E.U. 
would consider using only if preventive measures fail. Concerning adop-
tion, the document is not clear about what the measures actually entail or 
whether they are an exclusive Security Council matter. It mainly states 
that this body "should playa central role." 
From these principles, the E.U. Strategy designs an action plan with four 
groups of measures: (1) measures to implement an effective multilateral 
response; (2) measures to promote international and regional stability; 
(3) measures to implement cooperation with key E.u. associates; and (4) 
internal structural and organizational measures. The last group relates to 
issues not relevant for the purpose of this article. 26 The bulk of E.U. 
25. These principles underlie the E.U. Strategy and they can be found, specifically, within 
paragraphs 14 and 15. 
26. The E.U. Council machinery dealing with the implementation of the E.U. Strategy includes 
a Personal Representative of the Secretary General and three Working Groups acting under the 
CFSP pillar: CONOP (non-proliferation), CODUN (on UN Disarmament issues), and COARM (on 
conventional arms exports). These groups include representatives from Member States, the Com-
mission, and the Personal Representative and meet once a month. Within this context, the E. U. 
Strategy calls for the establishment of a specific unit within the Council's Secretariat to reinforce the 
present arrangements. This unit would function as a monitoring center, entrusted with the monitor-
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measures propose effective multilateralism in determining what action to 
take against those who proliferate WMD.27 
1. Measures to implement an efficient multilateralism 
The E.U. tackles the execution of an efficient multilateral response 
against proliferation with a large set of measures that can be separated 
into three groupS:28 (i) promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding 
WMD; (ii) reinforcement of verification mechanisms and control of in-
ternationallegal regulations; and (iii) avoidance of the misuse of dual use 
(civil and military) goods and processes. 
(i) The promotion of relevant legal regulations regarding WMD is pur-
sued through three complementary measures. First, diplomatic action 
seeks the universalisation of existing international treaties, including 
their verification regimes - like those contained in the Additional Proto-
cols of the IAEA. 29 Second, direct assistance - technical and/or financial 
- is provided to third states to ensure the correct implementation of inter-
national agreements on WMD. This refers specifically to the implemen-
tation of two agreements, the BTWC and the CWC, that seek to over-
come the administrative (legislative, institutional, etc.) and/or financial 
difficulties (implementation costs) that some states face in complying 
with these international commitments. Third, financial support is given 
to relevant multilateral institutions (IAEA, the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), 
ing of the consistent implementation of the E.U. Strategy and the collection of information and 
intelligence, in liaison with other E.U. agencies (i.e. the Situation Centre) and as a full associate of 
the Commission. The creation of the Centre, not yet put in place, could affect specific Community 
competencies, currently in the hands of the European Commission. 
27. At the end of each semester, the Council debates and adopts a progress report on the im-
plementation of this action plan. These reports are a great tool in evaluating the advantages and 
obstacles of the E. U. as a nonproliferation actor as well as the agreements and disagreements of its 
member States on specific aspects of measures envisaged in the action plan. Until now, there are 
three Reports. See Council of the E.U., Doc. 10448/04, Brussels, June 10, 2004 (First Progress 
Report); Doc. 15246/04, Brussels, December 3, 2004 (Second Progress Report); and Doc. 9898105, 
Brussels, June 8, 2005 (Third Progress Report) (visited July 1,2005) <http://ue.E.U . .int>. 
28. The document groups these measures into six main tenets: (I) the universalisation of 
current legal regulations and verification regimes regarding disarmament and non-proliferation; (2) 
emphasis on the role of the UN Security Council in increasing the amount of available information; 
(3) reinforcement of widespread support for verification regimes; (4) reinforcement of policies and 
export control practices; (5) development of security for materials and equipment to prevent unau-
thorized access and diversion risks; and (6) intensification of the fight against illegal trafficking. 
29. This measure includes some clear E.U. action, in partiCUlar the Common Position decided 
November 17, 2003 on the globalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements concerning 
WMD. See 2003 OJ.E.U. (L 302) 34. Another precedent, though one of a more specific nature, is 
the Council Decision 2003/567/CFSP of July 21, 2003 implementing Common Position 
19991533/CFSP related to the European Union's promotion of early implementation of the Compre-
hensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). See 2003 OJ.E.U. (L 192) 53. 
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and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW)). 
(ii) The second group of measures seeks to reinforce the verification 
mechanisms and control of international legal regulations related to 
WMD. To this end, the Strategy proposes the effective use of existing 
mechanisms and the design of new ones. This commits the E.U. to pro-
mote challenge inspections within the CWC framework and to continue 
the study of the verification instruments for the BTWC and the CWe. In 
regard to the BTWC, the E.U. seeks to establish a group of experts to 
assist with compliance with its norms. 30 
(iii) The third group contains measures to avoid the misuse of dual use 
(civil and military) goods and processes through export control, equip-
ment and materials security, and the fight against illegal trafficking. 
Concerning export control, the Strategy seeks to reinforce the E.U. re-
gime, as well as to ensure some degree of E.U. foreign policy coherence 
in these matters. 31 It calls for the establishment of a program to assist 
those countries with insufficient knowledge about exports control and the 
adoption of two specific restrictive measures. Together, these establish 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to subject exports to the ratification 
and implementation of the IAEA. Additional Protocol and encourage 
reinforced export controls over intangible transfers of dual use technol-
ogy. 
In regard to physical security, unauthorized access, or the potential of 
diverting equipment and materials, the E.U. pursues effective control of 
highly radioactive sources as well as the physical protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities.32 Moreover, the E.U. proposes reinforcing con-
30. Additionally, the E.U. participates in the annual meetings of States Parties and experts 
meetings leading up to the BTWC Review Conference in 2006. In March 2005, the Personal Repre-
sentative put forward suggestions on how the E.U. can promote universality and implementation of 
the BTWC and the relevant E.U. working groups are currently examining a preliminary draft E.U. 
joint action on support for the BTWC, which would be implemented in 2006. In addition, a loint 
Action in support of the CTBTO verification system is under consideration and, as we have already 
mentioned, the E.U. endorses the establishment of the IAEA Additional Protocol as the verification 
standard mechanism. 
31. The Strategy calls for coordinating E.U. policies within the framework of existing regimes; 
supporting the compliance of new member states with these regimes; promoting the Commission's 
participation in these international regimes; and stimulating when necessary the introduction of 
catch-all clauses in export control regimes. 
32. Concerning E.U. internal action, see Council Directive 2003/122IEURATOM of 22 De-
cember 2003 on the Control of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources, 2003 
O.J.E.U. (L 346) 57-64 (Euratom). In addition, all member states have ratified the Convention on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and have agreed to convene a Conference to widen the 
scope of this Convention. 
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troIs on pathological microorganisms and toxins, and promoting a dia-
logue between E.U. and U.S. industries to increase the awareness of 
WMD issues, particularly those related to biological weapons. 33 E.U. 
external action has focused on radioactive sources and is being imple-
mented through the IAEA structures. 34 Nonetheless, the E.U. also carries 
on autonomous actions supporting the nuclear nonproliferation and secu-
rity programs in Russia. 
Finally, the document proposes three measures to fight illegal trafficking: 
the adoption of common E.U. penal sanctions; measures to control the 
transit and transfer of high-risk materials; and support for international 
initiatives aimed at combating illegal trafficking. Their implementation 
includes a European Community Regulation amending the Community 
Customs Code to ensure enhanced safety and improvement of risk analy-
sis,35 the declaration of the E. U. Council of June 1, 2004 - which sup-
ports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) - and, in particular, the 
Statement on Interdiction Principles adopted on September 4, 2003 by 
the states that participate in the PSI. 36 In contrast, discussion continues 
on the adoption and possible implementation of common policies related 
to criminal sanctions for illegal export, brokering and smuggling of 
WMD related material. 
2. Measures to promote international and regional stability 
Reflecting the E.U.'s position emphasizing international cooperation for 
achieving international and regional stability, the action plan proposes 
33. The E.U. strategy does not specify what type of measures will further these goals, nor does 
it recommend any concrete action by the E.U. and/or its member states; these can be found in the 
June 2003 Action Plan. See Measures Nos. 18-19 of the Action Plan adopted in June 2003. Two of 
these measures must be emphasized. First, the creation of a center for disease control. See Regula-
tion (EC) No. 85112004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing 
a European center for disease prevention and control, 2004 O.J.E.U. (L 142) I-II, and Alessandro 
Andreoni, The E. U. Moves Closer to Establishing a European CDC, January 8, 2004, 
<www.cns.miis.eduipubs/weekl040108.htrn>. Second, a proposal encouraged by the E.U. and its 
member States during the BTWC annual experts meeting to elaborate guidelines on how to boost 
efficient national legislation as well as compliance with the BTWC dispositions-the E.U. stance was 
actually contrary to the U.S. one. See Tucker, The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment, 
II NONPROLIFERATION REv. 32-33 (2004). 
34. See Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities 
under its Nuclear Security Program and in the framework of the implementation of the E.U. Strategy 
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004 O.J.E.U. (L 182) 46-50. The financial 
reference amount for the implementation of this Joint Action is $ 3,329,000 (euros). According to 
the Third Progress Report, the envisaged renewal of the Joint Action will expand geographic priori-
ties to cover countries in North Africa and the Middle East and will include a new project providing 
legislative assistance to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
35. Adopted by the E.U. Council on May 23, 2005. 
36. See Council of the European Union, Non-Proliferation Support of the Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative, Brussels, June I, 2004, Doc. 10052/04 (Presse 189). The Declaration confirms the 
connection between the PSI and the U.N. Security Council Res. 1540, April 28, 2004. 
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reinforcing E.U. cooperative threat reduction programs and integrating 
WMD nonproliferation concerns into the E.U. 's political, diplomatic, and 
economic activities and programs. The Russian Federation is the main 
target of those programs and, thus, the first E.U. action in this field has 
been the Council Joint Action of November 22, 2004. 37 
The second action envisaged in the E.U. Strategy is to increase E.U. fi-
nancial support for disarmament and nonproliferation38 by including a 
specific line in the European Community budget for WMD disarmament 
and nonproliferation activities and encouraging member states to con-
tribute financially.39 Unfortunately, a specific Community budget line 
for WMD has yet to be created.40 Nor has the E.U. adopted the technical 
assistance program for third countries envisioned by the strategy. This 
program should have the aim of guaranteeing security and control over 
high-risk material, facilities, and information by facilitating the conver-
sion ofWMD expertise. 
Better results have been achieved with the implementation of main-
streaming nonproliferation policies into the E.U.'s relations with third 
countries, including a nonproliferation clause in agreements with those 
countries. Although the clause does not have the same language and 
scope in all these treaties, in all cases it requires effective action against 
proliferation risks and implementation is monitored using regular politi-
cal dialogue between the parties to the agreements, at both ministerial 
37. This joint action extended the E.U. disannament and nonproliferation program to the 
Russian Federation after June 2004 by supporting the physical protection of a Russian nuclear site. 
This extension is linked to, and is a result of, the extension of the period of application of the Com-
mon Strategy on Russia. See Council Joint Action 20041796/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on the 
issue of support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation. 
38. The E.U. committed itself, during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, to support the G8 Inter-
national Association with $100 million (euros) over a period of 10 years in order to fight against the 
proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. 
39. The credits included in the E.U. budget under the heading "Non-proliferation and disar-
mament," are meant for two purposes. First, to fund actions which contribute to the reduction of 
WMD and, second, to fund operations to fight against the spread of light weaponry and illicit arms 
trafficking, unless these actions are mentioned in the Cotonu Agreement (which deals with this type 
of actions within the ACP countries). This budget structure persists to the present. 
40. Consequently, the E.U. financial resources in the non-proliferation area come from the 
CFSP budget ($15 million (euros) in 2004 and $17 million (euros) in 2005) and the Community 
budget (around $40 million (euros) per year, particularly through the TACIS program). In addition, 
the European Parliament introduced an amount of$3 million (euros) into the 2004 and the 2005 EC 
budget for a Pilot Project, the purpose of which is to investigate measures by which the E. U. instru-
ments can support actions against the proliferation of WMD and combat the proliferation of light 
weapons and illicit arms trafficking. Out of this, the Commission used $1.5 million (euros) under 
the 2004 budget to finance the Research Institute SIPRI to analyze how the Community could con-
tribute to WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, related materials, equipment and technologies. 
For 2005, the Commission will use the $1.5 million (euros) for launching cooperative actions in the 
field of export control. See Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 11-12. 
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and official levels. 41 These agreements do not provide for specific en-
forcement mechanisms and the enforceability of such clauses is sur-
rounded with specific legal problems. Nonetheless, they do provide a 
basis for continued pressure and permit the E.D. to initiate the necessary 
dialogue and work with the third country in order to achieve effective 
compliance with the nonproliferation clause.42 
Lastly, the Strategy refers to increasing E.D. efforts to solve regional 
conflicts by using all available instruments, in particular the framework 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This is very much in accord with 
the general E.D. policy of addressing the root causes of the problem 
while adopting measures to counter proliferation in the shorter term. The 
E.D. Strategy does not specify particular measures for the Mediterranean 
region, despite previously classifying it as a priority. Nonetheless, E.D. 
is taking steps in order to restart a dialogue on disarmament and nonpro-
liferation in the context of the Barcelona process. 43 
3. Measures to implement cooperation with associate countries 
The point of departure is simple: international cooperation on nonprolif-
eration should begin with agreement among associate and main ally 
countries. This section of the E.D. Strategy alludes to the need to ensure 
adequate supervision of the Joint Declaration for Nonproliferation be-
41. This clause includes a commitment against WMD proliferation and its vectors by, among 
other means, the complete implementation of existing international instruments and the creation of 
an efficient system for national exports control. The nonproliferation clause has been inserted in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan and in the Association Agreement with 
Syria. In addition, a clause referencing cooperation in countering proliferation of WMD (based in 
the nonproliferation clause) has been inserted in the revised ACP-E.U. Cotonou agreement con-
cluded by the E.U. with 78 countries and signed on June 24,2005. In parallel, Action Plans with the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean in the context of the European Neighborhood 
Policy include a WMD chapter, containing the key elements of the WMD clause. In the case of 
Pakistan, a parallel instrument to the Community Agreement that would contain a nonproliferation 
clause is to be negotiated by the Council and, as a follow-up to the E.U.-Indian Summit in 2004, an 
Action Plan with India is being negotiated which will include some actions related to WMD. For 
more details on these issues, see Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 13-14. 
42. Annalisa Giannella, Permanent Representative of the Secretary General/High Representa-
tive on the Non-proliferation ofWMD, explained it clearly: "Once we [the E.U.) have concluded the 
agreement, we should not leave the other country alone and then, after a certain period of time, 
assess whether they are complying or not; we have to work with this country and see what they need 
in order to comply with the clause." See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Preventing 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The E. U. Contribution, 131h Report of Sess. 2004-
2005 (AprilS, 2005) Minutes of Evidence, Question 58. 
43. See Third Progress Report, supra note 27, at 14. 
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tween the E.U. and the U.S. 44 and coordination with other key associate 
countries and the adoption, if necessary, of joint initiatives. 
As the United States is a critically important actor in the campaign 
against WMD proliferation, nonproliferation is on the agenda of every 
E.U.-U.S. summit meeting and a cooperative action plan was agreed on 
at the June 2004 summit. This was renewed at the 2005 summit, under 
the title of "Joint Program of Work on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction."45 In addition, the E.U. and the U.S. have devel-
oped a tradition of consulting whenever important international events in 
the area of nonproliferation and disarmament arise (at the expert level as 
well as at political directors and ministerial levels) and there are regular 
staff-to-staff contacts. 46 
E.U. interaction and cooperation with other international actors also ex-
ists, but with different features. The E.U. assists Russia and other ex-
Soviet Republics financially and technically in the area of nonprolifera-
tion and disarmament (protection of sites, conversion of scientists, etc.). 
India, Pakistan and China are all on the priority list of the strategy and, 
specifically, the E.U. plans to assist them with the setting up of export 
control legislation and implementation systems. 
IV. THE GROUND TO FURTHER CHANGES IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF WMD 
The comparison between the U.S. and the E.u. strategies reveals deep 
differences on the diagnosis, goals and treatment of the risks and chal-
lenges posed by WMD nowadays. These differences ground the current 
situation of the WMD international regime and the emergence of new 
trends in the nonproliferation arena. 
As a preliminary conclusion, it is possible to define U.S.IE.U. ap-
proaches as reactive and proactive, respectively. The scope and goals of 
U.S. policy belong to the parameters of classical state defense: targeted 
enemies - hostile states and terrorists - and protection against those ene-
44. See European Council President C. Simi tis, European Commission President R. Prodi & 
U.S. President G.W. Bush, Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestnJction, 
Washington D.C. (June 25, 2003) Doc. 10902/03 (Presse 181). 
45. Documents and Declarations adopted at the E.U.-U.S. summits can be found at 
<http://europa.E.U . .inticomrnlexternaIJelationslU.S.lintro/summit.htm> (visited July 1,2005). 
46. Concerning the interactions, complementarities and some points of disagreements on 
nonproliferation issues between the E.U. and U.S., see the declarations and memorandum of Ms. 
Giannella at the House of Lords. See House of Lords, European Union Committee, Preventing 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestnJction: The E. U. Contribution, 13 th Report of Sess. 2004-
2005 (AprilS, 2005) Minutes of Evidence, Question 61 at 43. 
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mies, specifically against their WMD capabilities. Consequently, the 
U.S. has adopted a self-defense approach that explains the dominance of 
counter-proliferation and unilateral measures in the U.S. Strategy. 47 
Significantly, the U.S. strategy assigns no role to U.S. disarmament in 
the combat against WMD, eroding the fundamental bargain that under-
lies the nonproliferation regime. In the case of the E.U., its diagnosis 
and goals are determined by the real nature of the E.U.: an international 
organization used to deal with international problems through a multilat-
eral mechanism. Since two of its member states are legal nuclear pow-
ers, the E.D. does not ask for a complete disarmament ofWMD. Instead, 
the E.U. focus on proliferation follows a logical nexus of causality that 
links proliferation to an increased risk of utilization. Within this context, 
the E.U. designs measures to contribute to the achievement of a double 
aim: the elimination of proliferation programs and the reduction of diver-
sion. The E.U.'s structure also explains its pragmatism in establishing 
goals in the fight against WMD and reveals the current debate on the 
scope of the principle prohibiting the threat or the use of force. 
U.S.-E.D. differences set a limit to the scope of new international legal 
obligations and the application of the international legal rules already in 
force. In fact, the U.S. diagnosis of the WMD threat makes the elabora-
tion of new general norms with universal scope difficult because, from 
the U.S. point of view, the threat has no objective delimitation: it does 
not come from the mere existence of WMD or, even, from proliferation 
but depends on the characteristics of their 'owners.' Only on the link 
between WMD and terrorism can the D.S. and the E.U. strategies find 
some common understanding, although their tone, attitudes and diagno-
ses of the threat differs substantially. Denying terrorist groups access to 
WMD has become the arena for specific U.S.-E.U. joint action. In con-
trast, problems arising from 'proliferant states' become political ques-
tions, and U.S.-E.D. joint action depends on the concrete circumstances 
of each case. 
Political emphasis on the risks coming from the link between WMD and 
terrorism has consequences for the application of international obliga-
tions and rules related to WMD. This emphasis has its main expression 
in UN Resolution 1540, adopted by the Security Council on April 28, 
2004, under the aegis, among others, of the U.S. and the E.D.. Acting 
under Chapter VII, the Security Council decided that all states shall 
adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws and domestic controls to 
47. Using Bolton's words, the Bush Administration "is reinventing the nonproliferation regime 
it inherited' and its policies show "that a robust use of the sovereign authorities that we [U.S.], and 
our allies, have at our disposal can bring about real results." See Boiton, supra note 19, at 395. 
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avoid the access of non-state actors to WMD and their means of delivery. 
The Security Council also established a committee that will report on the 
implementation of this resolution. Even if the Security Council recog-
nizes that some states may require assistance in implementing the provi-
sions of this resolution in their territories, there is no provision organiz-
ing an international mechanism to provide that assistance. Instead, the 
resolution calls for the voluntary cooperation of those states in a position 
to offer such assistance. 48 Examples of this voluntary cooperation are the 
U.S. program of nuclear threat reduction (Nunn-Lugar Program),49 fo-
cused on minimizing the proliferation risks attached to nuclear material 
in the former Soviet Union, as well as the G-8 initiative agreed upon in 
June 2002, which had similar goals and territorial scope. As we have 
seen previously, the E.U. is developing this kind of assistance program. 
Yet, their benefits and advantages do not entirely banish distrust. Many 
countries, not only Russia, have difficulty implementing the SC Resolu-
tion and other WMD obligations, and important gaps arise in the destruc-
tion and control of WMD, as in the case of biological weapons. This is 
not to deny the achievements of voluntary international cooperation but 
to point out its risks and deficits and the desirability of international 
mechanisms to provide assistance to states 'unable' to find voluntary 
partners. 
Concerning compliance, the U.S. policy scope (hostile states) introduces 
discriminatory criteria when determining whether any country has ful-
filled its international obligations. This affects the application of interna-
tional treaties and other WMD-related obligations not endowed with 
verification and enforcement mechanisms, because a very relevant inter-
national actor - the U.S. - will not pay attention to cases of noncompli-
ance coming from states not hostile to U.S. security or other interests. 
The U.S. policy sends a clear message to the international community: 
noncompliance with WMD obligations can be counterbalanced by a 
'healthy' political relationship with the U.S .. In fact, since the U.S. will 
not be bothered with these cases, these proliferation programs will not be 
of 'concern worldwide' and, consequently, will not meet the require-
ments established in the E.U. strategy for European attention. 
The diverging approach of the U.S. and the E.U. on the role, application 
and development of international verification mechanisms to monitor 
48. The Security Council adopted the resolution unanimously. Nonetheless, the debates reflect 
many points of concern, as it is the appropriateness of using the Security Council to "legislate" on 
such an issue or the need to stress the relationship between proliferation and disannament. See U.N. 
Doc. SIPV.4956 (2004). 
49. On the current difficulties and obstacles of this program, see Richard G. Lugar, Nunn-
Lugar in the Second Term, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 233 (2005). 
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states' compliance with their WMD Treaty obligations is well known. 
U.S. opposition to international verification mechanisms, made evident 
with regards the BTWC, in December 2001, prevented the adoption of a 
protocol with such a mechanism. 50 The U.S. also sought to revise the 
existing negotiating mandate for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
(FMCT), which called for an "effectively verifiable" treaty, because it 
considers that an effectively verifiable FMCT that does not compromise 
U.S. national security interests is not achievable. 51 A similar argument 
justifies the U.S. refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). 52 Instead, U.S. policy relies on unilateral measures or, 
at the most, on selective multilateral measures, such as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), announced in May 2003 by President Bush. 
PSI is an informal agreement to intercept ships, aircraft, and vehicles 
suspected of carrying nuclear and other WMD missiles and related tech-
nologies or materials to or from "countries of proliferation concern." It 
allows participating states to detain and search suspect shipments as soon 
as they enter their territory, territorial waters, or airspace. 53 The E.U. 
approved a Declaration supporting this initiative on June 1, 2004, em-
phasizing its connection with the UN Security Council Resolution obli-
gations, and most of the E.U. States have joined the PSJ.54 
Finally, major concerns arise concerning the enforcement of WMD obli-
gations. As we have seen before, U.S. policy clearly endorses the unilat-
eral use of force as a counter proliferation instrument. Such a use of 
force not only avoids any kind of collective control and breaks with the 
50. Regarding the problems encountered during the negotiations for the Additional Protocol, 
see Malcolm R. Dando, Preventing Biological Warfare: The Failure of American Leadership (Great 
Britain: Palgrave, 2002); Jonathan B. Tucker, The BWC New Process: A Preliminary Assessment, 
II NONPROLIFERATION REv. I (2004), and Kenneth D. Ward, The BWC Protocol: Mandate for 
Failure, 12 NONPROLIFERATION REv.! (2004). 
51. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. Fiscal Year 
2006 Joint Performance Plan (Feb. 2005) p. 121 
<http://www .state.gov/documents/organizationl4l623.pdf>. 
52. See Patricia Hewitson, Between Empire and Community: The United States and Multilat-
eralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: Arms Control: Nonproliferation and Reduction of 
Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 451 (2003). 
53. "PSI is an activity, not an organization .... Through PSI, we create the basis for action to 
ensure that we can stop proliferators in their tracks .... PSI's foundation is our respective national 
legal systems and relevant international authorities." Bolton, supra note 19, at 400. Bolton's mis-
understanding (one of them) is to say that the PSI reflects the reality that proliferators are circum-
venting existing rules against proliferation. If it is, PSI proves the necessity of international en-
forcement mechanisms and the role of international cooperation in order to apply international 
norms already in force. 
54. For two different perspectives concerning the legal problems around the PSI, see Samuel 
E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges 14 J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. & POL'y 253 (2005) and Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, 
Counterproliferation, and International Law 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 507 (2005). 
20
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/7
2005] u.s. AND E.U. STRATEGIES VS. WMD 139 
customary requirements of self-defense but, in addition, abrogates a U.S. 
traditional security assurance: not to use nuclear forces against non-
nuclear countries. On the other hand, the E.U. Strategy is not clear on 
either the role of coercion - especially military force - against prolifera-
tion threats, or on the position of the Security Council. The E.U. envi-
sions the adoption of coercive measures (under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter and other measures under international law) but is not clear about 
what such measures might actually entail or whether they are an exclu-
sive Security Council matter. It mainly states that that body "should play 
a central role," not the primary competence as stipulated in article 24 of 
the UN Charter. In this way, the E.U. Strategy leaves open the door for 
the possibility of coercive measures of a military nature without the ex-
plicit authorization from the Security Council. E.U. ambiguity contrib-
utes to diminish the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. This 
credibility rests on three main pillars: the network of commitments be-
tween nuclear and non-nuclear states; the prohibition of chemical and 
biological weapons (with a different scope under conventional and cus-
tomary rules); and the proper functioning of verification mechanisms in 
order to guarantee the compliance of states with these obligations. The 
UN Security Council is uniquely empowered with the right to declare a 
state proliferation program to be a threat to international peace and secu-
rity and to determine proper sanctions against such a state. Unilateral 
statements about willingness to violate international legal rules (although 
rhetorical) are usually at the root of proliferation programs and may well 
be the source of the fears causing unpredictable arms races. In addition, 
the threat or use of force has proven ineffective in avoiding or eliminat-
ing a proliferation program: Iraq's proliferation program ended with the 
UN inspection action in 1991-1998, as the subsequent U.S. occupation of 
Iraq has demonstrated. 55 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
Are we witnessing the misuse and decline of international legal instru-
ments or beholding the birth of new complementary measures in the 
WMD international regime? The answer to this question exceeds the 
scope and purpose of this article. However, comparison of the U.S. and 
the E.U. policies to combat WMD - and the scope of their agreements 
and disagreements - permits U.S. to address two consequences. First, the 
role of international organizations and verification mechanisms in the 
application of international rules concerning WMD is being downplayed. 
Instead, this application relies principally upon the internal structure and 
55. See Jessica Tuchman, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations, 10 GLOBAL 
GoVERNANCE 265-271 (2004). 
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capabilities of states, while some states attribute to themselves the right 
to enforce certain WMD obligations. Second, the prevailing approach to 
fighting the proliferation of WMD is through selective and informal in-
ternational cooperation: selective because there is a preference for inter-
national cooperation between like-minded countries;56 informal since the 
preference is for non-legally binding agreements. 
Should these consequences consolidate in time, changes might appear in 
the principle of equal sovereignty between states and in the nature of 
international cooperation. Whether this is a necessary evolution, a con-
juncture period, or a step back in the international legal system, only 
history - and further research - will be able to clarify. 
Cambridge MA, September 23, 2005 
56. Dupuy qualifies this cooperation as "collective unilateralism." See J.M. Dupuy, The Place 
and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, II EUR. J. INT'L L. 29 (2000). 
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